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ABSTRACT:	  Lipsky’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  implementation	  gap	  in	  welfare	  policy	  in	  ‘Street-­‐
level	  Bureaucracy’	  focuses	  on	  the	  problem	  front-­‐line	  discretion	  but	  ‘brackets	  off’	  the	  
discretion	  of	  senior	  managers.	  	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  draw	  on	  a	  qualitative	  study	  to	  argue	  
that	  senior	  managers	  can	  also	  exercise	  significant	  discretion	  and	  that	  their	  
discretion	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  policy	  confusion	  and	  contradiction,	  
and	  resource	  inadequacy	  that	  characterise	  ‘the	  corrupted	  world	  of	  service’	  of	  front	  
line	  discretion.	  In	  this	  context	  front	  line	  discretion	  is	  may	  be	  used	  by	  front	  line	  staff	  
to	  bridge	  the	  policy	  implementation	  gap	  created	  by	  senior	  managers.	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In	  the	  thirty	  years	  plus	  since	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  was	  first	  published	  Lipksy’s	  
work	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  classic	  text,	  such	  that:	  ‘…	  the	  bright-­‐eyed,	  
bushytailed	  reader	  of	  it	  cannot	  help	  but	  come	  away	  with	  a	  more	  realistic	  
appreciation	  of	  the	  possibilities	  for	  changing	  the	  world	  through	  policy	  and	  
government.’	  (Kosar	  2011:	  302).	  However,	  since	  the	  book	  was	  originally	  published	  
there	  have	  been	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  organisation	  of	  public	  services,	  not	  least	  
the	  rise	  of	  new	  public	  management,	  that	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  continuing	  
relevance	  of	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  to	  understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  
policy	  and	  front-­‐line	  practices.	  Public	  sector	  managers	  have	  sought	  to	  divest	  
themselves	  of	  the	  image	  of	  administration	  and	  replace	  this	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  
manage	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  more	  business-­‐like	  values.	  In	  public	  welfare	  services,	  where	  
there	  is	  a	  strong	  element	  of	  professional	  provision	  of	  service,	  the	  increased	  activity	  
of	  senior	  management	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  having	  had	  a	  dramatic	  impact	  on	  welfare	  
services,	  not	  least	  through	  the	  curtailing	  of	  front-­‐line	  discretion.	  Street-­‐level	  
practitioners,	  some	  commentators	  have	  argued,	  no	  longer	  have	  discretion	  because	  
managers	  have	  created	  a	  coherent	  system	  of	  control	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  
extensive	  and	  effective	  systems	  of	  procedures,	  budgets	  and	  surveillance.	  
	  
However,	  the	  continuing	  success	  of	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  (Lipksy	  1980	  &	  2010)	  
can	  in	  part	  be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  prescience	  of	  Lipsky’s	  analysis	  and	  the	  robust	  way	  in	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which	  he	  challenges	  the	  assumption	  that	  modern	  management	  can	  create	  a	  new,	  
well-­‐oiled,	  business-­‐like	  machine	  of	  public	  policy	  delivery	  (Evans	  2012).	  In	  his	  
analysis	  of	  discretion	  in	  street-­‐level	  Bureaucracies	  he	  focuses	  on	  the	  continuing	  (and	  
inevitable)	  level	  of	  discretion	  front	  line	  staff	  continue	  to	  exercise	  despite	  
management	  reforms	  in	  public	  services.	  
	  
A	  problem,	  though,	  with	  Lipsky’s	  analysis	  is	  that	  it	  gives	  insufficient	  attention	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  managers	  as	  actors	  with	  significant	  discretion	  in	  the	  policy	  implementation	  
process;	  or	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  decisions	  of	  senior	  managers	  may	  influence	  	  both	  
policy	  implementation	  directly	  and	  the	  context	  of	  discretion	  encountered	  by	  street	  
level	  bureaucrats.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  want	  to	  look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  senior	  management	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  
to	  the	  corrupted	  world	  of	  service	  (Lipsky	  2010:	  xv)	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  
characterises	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies;	  and	  consider	  how	  managers	  respond	  to	  
this	  environment.	  In	  talking	  about	  senior	  managers	  I’m	  not	  only	  talking	  about	  an	  
organisational	  strata	  but	  also	  the	  ideas	  associated	  with	  this	  level	  of	  management	  
that	  managers	  should	  be	  in	  control	  of	  public	  organisations,	  and	  that	  they	  should	  run	  
these	  organisations	  according	  to	  business	  principles	  and	  business	  concerns,	  
particularly	  economic	  concerns	  for	  efficiency	  and	  parsimony	  (Kirkpatrick	  et.	  al.	  
2005).	  In	  talking	  about	  senior	  management	  it’s	  also	  important	  to	  underline	  the	  
distinction	  this	  implies	  between	  senior	  managers	  	  (those	  who	  work	  most	  closely	  
with	  politicians	  and	  make	  strategic	  decisions	  within	  street-­‐level	  organisations)	  and	  
local	  managers	  (who	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  direct	  management	  of	  street-­‐level	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practitioners).	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  at	  the	  immediate	  management	  
level	  it	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  street-­‐level	  practitioners	  from	  their	  
direct	  managers,	  particularly	  in	  services	  that	  are	  delivered	  by	  professionals.	  These	  
local	  managers	  tend	  to	  play	  a	  dual	  role	  of	  practitioner	  and	  manager,	  and	  they	  often	  
share	  the	  same	  professional	  background	  as	  the	  staff	  they	  manage	  (Friedson	  1994).	  
It	  is	  only	  as	  one	  progresses	  up	  the	  management	  hierarchy	  in	  most	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracies	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrat	  and	  manager	  
becomes	  clear	  (Evans	  2010,2012).	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  and	  
the	  policy	  processes	  with	  which	  they	  are	  associated	  are	  in	  part	  the	  result	  of	  the	  
policy	  choices	  and	  priorities	  of	  senior	  managers	  and	  politicians.	  Accordingly	  the	  
difficult	  conditions	  that	  characterizes	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  are	  just	  not	  an	  
external	  problem	  that	  management	  can	  solve	  but	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  managerial	  
concerns	  with	  parsimony	  and	  promotion	  of	  entrepreneurialism,	  and	  political	  
concerns	  with	  the	  avoidance	  of	  blame	  and	  culpability.	  
	  
	  
MANAGERS	  IN	  ‘STREET-­‐LEVEL	  BUREAUCRACY’	  	  
	  
Street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  are	  difficult	  organisations	  within	  which	  to	  work,	  they	  are	  
characterised	  by	  the	  challenging	  working	  conditions	  they	  create	  for	  workers—
conditions	  of	  resource	  shortages	  and	  policy	  confusion	  (Lipsky	  1991).	  Policy	  
objectives	  tend	  to	  be	  ambitious,	  ambiguous,	  vague	  or	  conflicting,	  and	  resources	  are	  
never	  sufficient	  to	  the	  task	  at	  hand.	  	  Furthermore,	  they	  are	  organisations	  that	  
deliver	  welfare	  services	  to	  the	  public	  in	  in	  dynamic	  work	  situations,	  where	  there	  is	  a	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need	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  human	  dimension	  of	  service	  in	  terms	  of:	  ‘…complex	  tasks	  for	  
which	  elaboration	  of	  rules,	  guidelines,	  or	  instructions	  cannot	  circumscribe	  the	  
alternative’	  (Lipsky	  2010:15).	  
	  
Managers	  within	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  employ	  performance	  indicators	  to	  
measure	  outputs	  and	  use	  eligibility	  criteria	  to	  ration	  access	  to	  services	  and	  they	  are	  
committed	  to	  organisational	  management:	  ‘	  Managers’	  roles	  in	  this	  context	  are	  
associated	  with	  worker–management	  goals	  directed	  toward	  aggregate	  
achievement	  of	  the	  work	  unit	  and	  orientations	  directed	  toward	  minimizing	  
autonomy’	  (Lipsky	  2010:25).	  These	  organisations	  are	  more	  managed	  than	  
bureaucratic.	  Rather	  than	  being	  clerkly,	  rule-­‐governed	  administrative	  organisations,	  
street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  bear	  a	  striking	  similarity	  to	  modern	  managerialised	  
welfare	  bureaucracies	  —	  resplendent	  with	  strategies	  of	  control	  and	  coordination	  
such	  as	  performance	  and	  financial	  management,	  audit,	  and	  proceduralisation	  
(Harris	  2003).	  However,	  ‘Despite	  the	  massive	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  control	  and	  
direct	  their	  behavior’	  (Prottas	  1978:288)’	  the	  street-­‐level	  perspective	  recognises	  that	  
front	  line	  workers	  retain	  extensive	  discretion	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  make	  
decisions	  in	  a	  work	  role,	  despite	  managers’	  attempts	  to	  curtail	  their	  freedom.	  	  
	  
Lipsky	  exploration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  managers	  is	  surprising	  anodyne.	  Management,	  as	  it	  
has	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years,	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  claim	  to	  act	  and	  to	  
decide;	  it’s	  ‘…a	  means	  of	  maximizing	  organizational	  performance,	  service	  and	  profit	  
through	  cost-­‐cutting,	  increased	  regulation,	  privatization	  of	  services,	  reengineering	  
and	  evidence-­‐based	  management.’	  (Cunliffe	  2009:	  18)	  Lipsky’s	  managers,	  though,	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are	  rather	  un-­‐managerial	  by	  these	  measures.	  They	  are	  more	  reactive,	  much	  more	  
diplomatic	  creatures	  who:	  ‘...	  typically	  attempt	  to	  honor	  workers’	  preferences	  if	  they	  
are	  rewarded	  by	  reciprocity	  in	  job	  performance.’	  (Lipsky	  2010:25).	  	  
	  
	  
While	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  is	  striking	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  
limitation	  of	  management	  tools	  and	  techniques	  in	  controlling	  street-­‐level	  discretion	  
Lipsky’s	  account	  of	  the	  role	  and	  motivation	  of	  managers	  seems	  nostalgic	  –	  
reflecting	  a	  previous	  age	  when	  directors	  and	  administrators	  ,in	  private	  companies,	  
kept	  ‘…	  the	  peace;	  keep	  the	  factory	  running’(Purcell	  1991:	  34)	  and	  in	  the	  public	  
sector	  negotiated	  policies	  and	  procedures	  with	  practitioners	  and	  coordinate	  this	  
process	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  organisation	  (e.g.	  Straus	  et	  al	  1963).	  Lipsky	  brackets	  
off	  managers’	  motives	  and	  values	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  discretion	  within	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracies.	  	  Managers	  are	  presented	  as	  the	  cyphers	  of	  official	  policy,	  doing	  their	  
best	  in	  difficult	  circumstances	  to	  make	  policy	  work	  —	  striving	  to	  narrow	  the	  gap	  
between	  street-­‐level	  performance	  and	  ‘desired	  policy	  results’	  (Lipsky	  2010:223).	  
Unlike	  recalcitrant	  front-­‐line	  workers	  who	  challenge	  and	  distort	  policy,	  managers,	  
on	  Lipsky’s	  account,	  are	  paragons	  of	  policy	  implementation	  virtue:	  ‘Managers	  are	  
interested	  in	  achieving	  results	  consistent	  with	  agency	  objectives.	  Street-­‐level	  
bureaucrats	  are	  interested	  in	  processing	  work	  consistent	  with	  their	  own	  preferences	  
and	  only	  those	  agency	  objectives	  so	  salient	  as	  to	  backed	  up	  by	  significant	  
sanction.’(Lipsky	  2010:18-­‐19)	  However,	  characterising	  managers	  simply	  as	  
transmitters	  of	  policy	  ignores	  what	  management	  is	  about.	  	  It	  has	  a	  certain	  take	  on	  
how	  policy	  should	  be	  implemented,	  what	  the	  focus	  in	  policy	  implementation	  should	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be.	  Modern	  managers	  are	  key	  organisational	  actors.	  	  They	  assert	  and	  have	  achieved	  
the	  right	  to	  manage:	  ‘	  they	  should	  determine	  policy	  goals	  and	  actively	  seek	  to	  
implement	  them’	  (Kirkpatrick	  et.	  al.	  2005:	  65-­‐6).	  They	  have	  a	  parsimonious	  take	  on	  
their	  role	  —	  to	  achieve	  more	  for	  less	  (Osborne	  and	  Gaebler	  1992).	  	  	  Street-­‐level	  
bureaucracy	  theory	  needs	  to	  incorporate	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  managers	  
as	  discretionary	  decision	  agents	  with	  their	  own	  policy	  agenda,	  within	  its	  




MANAGING	  TO	  MAKE	  UP	  POLICY	  
	  
Lipsky’s	  critical	  analysis	  in	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  punctures	  the	  pretentions	  of	  
managers’	  omnipotence	  and	  omniscience	  continues	  to	  resonate.	  While	  there	  have	  
been	  significant	  moves	  by	  managers	  to	  control	  front	  line	  decision-­‐making	  	  ‘…it	  is	  far	  
from	  clear	  just	  how	  far	  these	  broader	  goals	  were	  achieved.	  Whether	  or	  not	  
managers	  in	  Social	  Service	  Departments	  (and	  ultimately	  policy	  makers)	  are	  now	  
better	  able	  to	  control	  and	  direct	  operational-­‐decision	  making	  is	  open	  to	  question.’	  	  
(Kirkpatrick	  et.	  al.	  2005	  114).	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  street-­‐level	  practitioners	  
continue	  to	  have	  some	  discretion	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  only	  they	  have	  discretion,	  or	  
that	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  primarily	  the	  results	  of	  their	  actions	  (Evans	  2015).	  Several	  
early	  commentators	  noted	  the	  problematic	  emphasis	  in	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  
on	  front-­‐line	  discretion	  and	  policy	  outcomes.	  While	  these	  commentators	  agree	  that	  
street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  play	  a	  role	  in	  changing	  and	  implementing	  policy,	  they	  also	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point	  out	  that	  the	  response	  of	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  to	  their	  situation—such	  as	  
rationing	  contact	  time—may	  be	  a	  management	  strategy,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  worker	  
response	  (Anon	  1981:813).	  Hasenfeld	  points	  out:	  ‘There	  simply	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  
support	  his	  [Lipsky’s]	  argument	  that	  the	  service	  practice	  in	  the	  welfare	  departs	  or	  
the	  school	  system	  are	  more	  a	  function	  of	  the	  discretion	  of	  lower-­‐level	  workers	  than	  
the	  deliberate	  policies	  of	  the	  organisational	  elites…	  ’.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  
importance	  of	  …’discretion	  but	  to	  suggest	  that	  its	  impact	  is	  far	  more	  limited	  than	  
the	  author	  [Lipsky]	  implies’	  (Hasenfeld	  1981:156).	  Furthermore,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
role	  of	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  to	  explain	  policy	  distortions	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  
the	  part	  of	  managers	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  throughout	  the	  organisational	  hierarchy,	  
who	  themselves	  play	  a	  role	  in	  developing	  and	  changing	  policy,	  and	  who	  often	  use	  
‘technical	  experts’	  on	  the	  front-­‐line	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  cover	  when	  problems	  arise	  
in	  the	  implementation	  of	  their	  own	  impractical	  strategic	  policies	  (Stone	  1983).	  The	  
significant	  acceleration	  in	  managerial	  power	  within	  public	  welfare	  organisations	  
over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  only	  emphasises	  the	  point	  that	  the	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracy	  perspective	  needs	  to	  engage	  with	  managers	  as	  powerful	  and	  
committed	  policy	  actors	  in	  its	  analysis	  of	  policy	  implementation	  and	  discretion.	  	  
	  
Lipsky,	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  new	  edition	  of	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’,	  
acknowledges	  that	  street-­‐level	  discretion:	  ‘	  …will	  be	  structured	  by	  the	  choices	  
available	  to	  the	  workers	  as	  options…provided	  by	  the	  policies’	  (Lipsky	  2010:223).	  
However,	  the	  anodyne	  picture	  of	  managers	  as	  uncomplicated	  policy	  actors	  in	  
‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’	  continues	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  new	  edition.	  	  Managers	  
simply	  structure	  sanctions	  and	  incentives	  to	  implement	  the	  policy	  they	  are	  directed	  
	   9	  
to	  put	  into	  effect.	  They	  have	  to	  be	  flexible	  and	  adapt	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  street-­‐
level	  worker	  compliance.	  They	  are	  the	  organisational	  police	  force	  striving	  to	  enforce	  
policy	  compliance	  against	  the	  disruptive	  forces	  of	  the	  resistant,	  self-­‐servicing	  and	  
recalcitrant	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  they	  have	  to	  manage	  (Lipsky	  1980&2010	  esp.	  
Chpt.	  2).	  
	  
What	  is	  striking	  in	  Lipsky’s	  account	  is	  that	  managers	  don’t	  seem	  to	  have	  their	  own	  
agenda	  –	  either	  personal	  or	  professional.	  But	  management	  claims	  the	  right	  to	  set	  its	  
own	  agenda	  and	  determine	  policy	  goals,	  is	  itself	  an	  approach	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  
embedded	  in	  an	  economic	  logic	  (Kirkpatrick	  et.	  al.	  2005.)	  and	  which	  emphasises	  
entrepreneurialism	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  (Lapsley	  2008).	  	  
	  
Managers’	  work,	  like	  the	  work	  of	  the	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  they	  manage,	  though,	  
is	  not	  simply	  technical;	  it	  also	  entails	  making	  policy	  decisions,	  setting	  priorities,	  
interpreting	  requirements	  and	  allocating	  resources	  (Harris	  2003,	  Evans	  2010	  &	  
2015).	  In	  exercising	  their	  prerogative	  to	  manage,	  managers	  allocate	  resources,	  and	  
interpret	  policies	  and,	  in	  this	  sense,	  they	  not	  only	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  making	  
policy	  decisions	  but	  also	  set	  the	  context	  within	  which	  subordinate	  discretion	  is	  
exercised.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  are	  the	  ‘…	  street	  ministers	  
of	  education,	  dispute	  settlement,	  and	  health	  services’	  (Lipsky	  2010:12)	  we	  also	  need	  
to	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  managers	  are	  also	  significant	  policy	  actors	  —the	  
smart-­‐suited	  ministers	  of	  education,	  dispute	  settlement,	  and	  health	  services.	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In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  consider	  these	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  research	  I	  have	  done	  
looking	  at	  discretion	  within	  an	  English	  social	  services	  department—a	  prime	  example	  
of	  a	  classic	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracy.	  
	  
	  
DISCRETION	  IN	  A	  STREET-­‐LEVEL	  BUREAUCRACY	  –	  A	  CASE	  STUDY	  
	  
The	  study	  was	  designed	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  discretion	  within	  a	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracy.	  A	  case	  studies	  allows	  us	  to	  explore	  the	  complex	  interaction	  of	  actors	  
and	  factors	  in	  a	  particular	  setting,	  but	  they	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  general	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  form	  these	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  
However,	  this	  claimed	  limitation	  (Stake	  1998)	  can	  be	  overplayed.	  It	  ignores	  the	  
important	  role	  that	  case	  studies	  can	  play	  in	  the	  critical	  examination	  and	  
development	  of	  theory	  (Walton1992).	  A	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  something	  more	  
general;	  where	  case	  studies	  are	  constructed	  to	  reflect	  theoretical	  concerns	  it’s	  
possible	  to	  draw	  wider	  conclusions	  about	  the	  theory	  from	  the	  particular	  cases	  
(Walton1992).	  	  
	  
Lipsky	  describes	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  a	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracy—	  the	  type	  of	  
organisation	  to	  which	  his	  theory	  applies—	  as	  a	  welfare	  organisation	  in	  which	  
overblown	  policy	  rhetoric	  exists	  alongside	  chronic	  understaffing	  and	  underfunding	  
(Lipsky	  2010:27-­‐28).	  	  This	  study	  looked	  at	  the	  experience	  of	  social	  workers	  and	  their	  
front-­‐line	  managers	  across	  two	  social	  work	  teams	  —	  one	  a	  mental	  health	  team,	  the	  
other	  an	  older	  people’s	  team	  —	  within	  the	  same	  social	  services	  organisation.	  	  The	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conditions,	  within	  the	  organisational	  context	  of	  overblown	  policy	  rhetoric	  and	  policy	  
imprecision,	  together	  with	  under	  resourcing	  of	  services,	  (Gomm	  et	  al	  2000)	  fit	  the	  
key	  conditions	  associated	  with	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  (Lipsky	  2010).	  This	  tension	  
was	  reflected	  in	  an	  increasingly	  intensive	  managerial	  regime	  of	  surveillance	  and	  
specification	  of	  practice.	  The	  study	  authority	  had	  been	  proactive	  in	  embracing	  new	  
public	  management—and	  its	  managers	  prided	  themselves	  on	  being	  ahead	  of	  the	  
game	  in	  introducing	  a	  more	  business-­‐like	  approach	  to	  service	  provision.	  
Management	  reforms	  within	  the	  study	  authority	  involved	  classic	  strategies	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  focused	  resource	  management,	  proceduralisation	  of	  practice	  and	  close	  
supervision	  of	  practice,	  particularly	  the	  application	  of	  eligibility	  criteria	  and	  
decisions	  about	  entitlement	  to	  services.	  
	  	  
The	  study	  employed	  qualitative	  methods	  of	  data	  gathering:	  primarily	  interviews	  
with	  the	  ten	  practitioners	  and	  five	  local	  managers	  (all	  of	  whom	  were	  qualified	  social	  
workers)	  across	  the	  two	  teams.	  The	  study	  also	  included	  observational	  and	  
documentary	  data.	  Practitioners	  and	  managers	  were	  interviewed	  using	  a	  schedule	  
that	  sought	  to	  balance	  a	  thematic	  structure	  with	  room	  for	  participants	  to	  express	  
their	  own	  perspective	  and	  subjective	  understandings	  (Flick,	  1998).	  The	  interview	  
schedule	  focused	  on	  the	  following	  themes:	  the	  impact	  of	  management	  control	  
techniques—such	  as	  procedures	  and	  resource	  control;	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  local	  managers	  and	  practitioners;	  and	  the	  use	  of	  discretion	  at	  street	  level.	  
The	  data	  analysis	  has	  involved	  iterative	  process	  of	  the	  critical	  reading,	  re-­‐reading	  
and	  organisation	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  analysis	  aims	  to	  develop	  a	  perspective	  which	  helps	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make	  sense	  of	  the	  data	  rather	  than	  uncover	  an	  underlying	  reality	  (Dey	  2004:91).	  
	  
	  
NOT	  QUITE	  MANAGING	  TO	  CONTROL	  	  
	  
Commentators	  in	  professional	  literatures,	  such	  as	  that	  in	  social	  work,	  have	  been	  
critical	  of	  ‘Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy’.	  They	  contend	  that	  Lipsky’s	  analysis	  is	  no	  longer	  
relevant:	  practitioners	  no	  longer	  have	  discretion	  (Howe	  1991)	  because	  managers	  
have	  created	  a	  coherent	  system	  of	  management	  that	  is	  able	  to	  control	  practice	  
through	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  procedures,	  budgets	  and	  surveillance	  (Howe	  1986,	  
1991):	  	  ‘Managers	  extract	  whatever	  uncertainty	  there	  is	  in	  the	  process	  so	  that	  their	  
“act”	  of	  devising	  the	  system	  of	  practice,	  surveillance	  and	  resource	  allocation	  which	  
determines	  the	  work	  of	  subordinates	  remains	  the	  major	  free	  act	  in	  the	  whole	  
business’	  (Howe	  1986:151).	  	  
	  
	  While	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  practitioners	  felt	  that	  management	  was	  increasingly	  
intrusive	  and	  guidance	  and	  surveillance	  extensive	  their	  experience	  was	  that	  they	  
retained	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  discretion	  in	  their	  work.	  Practitioners	  and	  managers	  
in	  the	  Mental	  Health	  Team	  felt	  that	  they	  had	  not	  been	  particularly	  subject	  to	  the	  
attention	  of	  senior	  management	  because	  it’s	  not	  a	  priority	  for	  them—‘I	  think	  that	  
we’re	  often	  forgotten	  about’.	  In	  contrast,	  people	  in	  the	  other	  team—the	  Older	  
Persons’—were	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  proactive	  and	  intrusive	  senior	  
management.	  They	  felt	  it	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  did	  their	  
work	  with	  close	  monitoring	  of	  finances,	  restrictive	  eligibility	  criteria	  (governing	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access	  to	  services)	  and	  a	  voluminous	  manual	  of	  procedures.	  However,	  these	  factors	  
constrained	  rather	  than	  eliminated	  discretion.	  Important	  sources	  of	  discretion	  
identified	  by	  Lipsky	  persisted	  at	  local	  level.	  	  The	  front	  line	  practitioners	  still	  felt	  they	  
had	  to	  engage	  with	  discretion	  in	  their	  work:	  making	  sense	  of	  conflicting	  policies,	  
interpreting	  and	  applying	  policies	  and	  balancing	  formal	  policy	  statements,	  resources	  
and	  the	  job	  of	  work	  at	  hand.	  For	  instance	  one	  practitioner,	  talking	  about	  the	  service	  
eligibility	  criteria,	  which	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  look	  precise	  and	  restrictive,	  pointed	  out:	  	  	  
…there’s	  still,	  I	  think,	  scope	  for	  interpretation...I	  can’t	  remember	  all	  the	  
wording,	  but	  I	  think	  it’s	  like	  with	  anything,	  it’s	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  care,	  
but	  what	  do	  you	  mean	  by	  that	  word	  ‘substantial’,	  or	  ‘imminent’,	  a	  situation	  
that’s	  imminently	  going	  to	  break	  down?	  	  
	  
	  
COVERT	  POLICY	  MAKING	  	  
	  
An	  interesting	  issue	  was	  brought	  up	  by	  several	  participants	  which	  illustrates	  the	  role	  
of	  managers	  as	  significant	  policy	  actors	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  their	  discretionary	  
decision-­‐making	  can	  influence	  the	  context	  of	  discretion	  at	  street	  level.	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  study	  adult	  services	  in	  England	  were	  provided	  under	  the	  NHS	  and	  
Community	  Care	  Act	  19901	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  principle	  that	  service	  users	  have	  a	  
right	  to	  be	  assessed	  for	  a	  service	  and	  that	  the	  local	  authority	  then	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  
decide	  whether	  to	  provide	  a	  service.	  Local	  authorities	  use	  eligibility	  criteria	  to	  
determine	  entitlement	  to	  services	  and	  while	  they	  have	  some	  discretion	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  NHS	  and	  Community	  Care	  Act	  1990	  has	  now	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  Care	  Act	  
2014	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determine	  their	  eligibility	  criteria,	  once	  these	  are	  determined	  they	  are	  required	  to	  
apply	  them	  consistently	  (Brayne	  and	  Carr	  2013).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  study	  a	  number	  of	  interviewees	  told	  me	  that	  over	  the	  preceding	  year	  
senior	  managers	  had	  told	  them	  to	  ignore	  the	  official	  eligibility	  criteria	  (‘the	  matrix’)	  
and	  instead	  apply	  tighter	  and	  narrower	  criteria	  to	  future	  requests	  for	  service.	  One	  
interviewee	  explained	  that:	  
When	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  that	  we	  would	  be	  providing	  services	  for	  matrix	  
1	  and	  2	  clients,	  that	  wasn’t	  supported	  by	  a	  policy,	  like	  a	  written	  document	  to	  
support	  that.	  It	  was	  a	  policy	  decision	  that	  was	  agreed	  with	  local	  councillors.	  
So	  we	  had	  a	  verbal	  directive.	  We	  had	  no	  written	  statement	  to	  support	  that,	  
which	  made	  the	  job	  ...	  of	  having	  to	  share	  that	  information	  with	  clients	  and	  
support	  people	  with	  that	  information—it	  made	  it	  much	  harder,	  because	  I	  
think	  people	  could	  give	  different	  accounts	  of	  that	  policy.	  
	  
	  
Practitioners	  were	  concerned	  about	  this.	  They	  objected	  to	  the	  authority’s	  failure	  to	  
acknowledge	  its	  tighter	  criteria	  publicly,	  and	  its	  perceived	  use	  of	  practitioners	  to	  
mask	  a	  political	  problem	  with	  funding.	  They	  were	  also	  concerned	  because	  of	  their	  
position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  service	  users	  who	  met	  the	  formal	  criteria	  but	  were	  below	  the	  line	  
set	  by	  the	  informal	  criteria.	  The	  practitioners	  as	  a	  group	  wrote	  to	  senior	  managers	  to	  
register	  their	  disquiet	  and	  demand	  that	  the	  authority	  formally	  acknowledge	  the	  
tighter	  criteria	  it	  was	  seeking	  to	  operate.	  The	  authority,	  as	  it	  is	  required	  by	  law	  
(Brayne	  and	  Carr	  2013),	  withdrew	  its	  request	  to	  front	  line	  staff	  and	  eventually	  
formally	  published	  new,	  tighter	  criteria	  and	  all	  service	  users	  were	  reassessed	  against	  
it.	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This	  example	  illustrates	  significant	  issues	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  management	  and	  the	  
policy	  implementation	  process	  within	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies.	  	  
	  
Senior	  managers	  here	  were	  clearly	  making	  policy	  and	  setting	  a	  context	  for	  
subordinate	  discretion.	  They	  were	  deciding	  (together	  with	  local	  politicians)	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  organisational	  policy	  in	  a	  significant	  sense.	  They	  were	  using	  their	  right	  to	  
manage	  to	  make	  policy	  choices.	  They	  could	  have	  asked	  politicians	  for	  more	  
resources	  to	  ensure	  official	  eligibility	  levels	  could	  be	  honoured,	  or	  have	  asked	  for	  a	  
review	  and	  revision	  of	  eligibility	  criteria	  to	  bring	  services	  in	  line	  with	  legal	  
requirements,	  but	  they	  did	  neither.	  Rather,	  they	  chose	  to	  push	  down	  an	  informal	  
instruction	  to	  narrow	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  so	  that	  they	  were	  more	  restrictive	  than	  
the	  official	  statement	  of	  entitlement	  –	  an	  approach	  that	  ran	  against	  national	  policy	  
guidelines	  and	  was	  open	  to	  legal	  challenge.	  
	  
	  
ENTREPRENEURIAL	  DISCRETION	  	  
	  
The	  practitioners’	  responses	  to	  management	  is	  also	  instructive.	  Acting	  together,	  
they	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  informal	  ‘instruction’	  to	  senior	  managers,	  citing	  the	  official	  
guidelines	  and	  national	  policy.	  Here,	  practitioners	  at	  street	  level	  were	  choosing	  to	  
use	  national	  policy	  to	  resist	  its	  local	  interpretation.	  This	  also	  raises	  interesting	  
questions	  about	  how	  discretion	  is	  being	  used.	  According	  to	  Lipsky	  managers	  do	  
their	  best	  to	  keep	  street	  level	  bureaucrats	  in	  line	  with	  policy.	  This	  example	  is	  the	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mirror	  image:	  here	  practitioners	  were	  challenging	  	  manager’s	  interpretation	  of	  
policy	  to	  bring	  it	  back	  in	  line	  with	  national	  policy	  (and	  the	  law).	  	  
	  
This	  was	  a	  particularly	  dramatic	  example	  but	  it	  was	  also	  emblematic	  of	  what	  
seemed	  to	  be	  a	  general	  strategy	  of	  senior	  management	  in	  handling	  the	  tension	  
between	  policy	  and	  resources	  by	  encouraging	  street	  level	  workers	  to	  adopt	  an	  
entrepreneurial	  attitude	  to	  policy	  —	  taking	  risks	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  
outcome.	  	  
	  
A	  pervasive	  example	  of	  this	  entrepreneurial	  expectation	  was	  the	  attitude	  
encouraged	  by	  senior	  managers	  towards	  the	  detailed	  and	  extensive	  policies	  and	  
procedures	  (that	  they	  had	  developed	  to	  govern	  and	  guide	  practice).	  Several	  
interviewees	  made	  the	  point	  that	  senior	  managers	  were	  both	  prescribing	  policies	  
‘over	  the	  top	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  worthiness	  and	  including	  everything	  under	  the	  sun	  
and	  every	  consideration’,	  but	  these	  managers	  also	  realised	  that	  the	  policies	  were	  
impractical	  and	  so	  gave	  covert	  permission	  (in	  terms	  of	  expectations	  and	  ‘nods	  and	  
winks’)	  to	  teams	  to	  not	  only	  to	  be	  flexible	  but	  also	  to	  ignore	  policy	  and	  procedures.	  	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  top-­‐down	  (informal)	  policy	  of	  flexible	  compliance	  within	  the	  
authority	  —	  prescribing	  procedural	  excellence	  and	  exactness	  while	  expecting	  and	  
encouraging	  of	  procedural	  pragmatism.	  	  
...	  there	  are	  so	  many	  rules	  and	  procedures	  and	  everything	  else	  that	  ...	  you	  
know,	  no-­‐one’s	  got	  the	  memory	  of	  an	  elephant,	  so	  everybody’s	  got	  a	  whole	  
load	  that	  they	  can’t	  remember.	  So	  there’s	  a	  sort	  of	  ignoring	  of	  certain	  things	  
...	  And	  in	  a	  sense	  I	  think	  that’s	  quite	  tolerated.	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The	  key	  skill	  for	  front-­‐line	  staff	  was	  knowing	  which	  policies	  were	  negotiable	  and	  
which	  policies	  were	  not.	  	  There	  were	  ‘must-­‐do’	  policies	  and	  these	  related	  to	  finance	  
and	  anything	  that	  might	  affect	  external	  perception	  of	  performance:	  	  
…	  the	  must-­‐do	  things	  is	  [sic]	  very	  much	  centred	  round	  money.	  Anything	  that	  
causes	  a	  problem	  around	  money	  is	  a	  definite	  no-­‐no!	  Getting	  expenditure	  
properly	  authorised	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  Making	  proper	  orders	  and	  so	  on.	  
Must-­‐dos	  will	  be	  around	  doing	  assessments	  in	  a	  fairly	  recognisable	  sort	  of	  
format,	  a	  fairly	  acceptable	  way	  of	  doing	  it	  	  
	  
	  
The	  reaction	  amongst	  front-­‐line	  staff	  to	  this	  environment	  was	  mixed	  —	  local	  
managers	  and	  local	  practitioners	  both	  divided	  equally	  into	  two	  groups.	  One	  group	  
was	  critical	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  should	  adopt	  an	  entrepreneurial	  approach	  
towards	  	  ‘the	  rules	  of	  the	  game’—	  they	  felt	  that	  there	  should	  not	  be	  so	  many	  rules	  as	  
to	  exclude	  discretion	  but	  where	  there	  were	  rules	  these	  should	  be	  respected—and	  
they	  were	  critical	  of	  senior	  managers	  who	  ignored	  the	  rules	  to	  stave	  off	  possible	  
complaints,	  and	  cut	  losses,	  rather	  than	  apply	  policy	  consistently:	  
‘I	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  level	  playing	  field…	  we’re	  carrying	  out	  assessments	  and	  
trying	  to	  work	  towards	  criteria,	  and	  then	  seeing	  that	  maybe	  somebody’s	  
been	  unhappy	  with	  that	  and	  they’ve	  then	  maybe	  gone	  through	  the	  
complaints	  procedure	  and	  maybe	  contacted	  a	  manager	  direct,	  and	  then	  …	  
the	  rules	  are	  bent,	  you	  know’.	  	  	  
	  
	  
The	  other	  group	  was	  happier	  to	  adapt	  ‘the	  rules	  of	  the	  game’	  but	  their	  approach	  was	  
grounded	  in	  their	  professional	  commitments	  rather	  than	  managerial	  concerns:	  ‘…if	  I	  
can	  justify	  it	  to	  myself	  and	  it	  is	  in	  the	  client’s	  best	  interest,	  that’s	  how	  I	  justify	  it…and	  
deciding	  for	  myself	  that	  actually	  this	  isn’t	  good	  for	  this	  client.	  I	  wouldn’t	  discuss	  it	  
with	  anybody.	  It	  would	  be	  my	  own	  judgement.’	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These	  two	  attitudes	  to	  the	  entrepreneurial	  discretionary	  context	  related	  to	  another	  
aspect	  of	  entrepreneurialism,	  that	  flexibility	  comes	  at	  a	  price	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
potential	  for	  blame.	  One	  practitioner,	  for	  instance,	  voiced	  concerns	  about	  the	  way	  
risk	  is	  understood	  and	  used	  in	  local	  policies:	  ‘…	  there	  is	  a	  perception	  that	  if	  
something	  does	  go	  wrong	  there’s	  some	  sort	  of	  culpability	  there	  …	  although	  you’re	  
sharing	  it	  with	  your	  line	  manager’.	  
	  
One	  aspect	  of	  this	  explains	  why	  the	  challenge	  to	  the	  senior	  managers’	  attempt	  to	  
introduce	  an	  unofficial	  narrow	  eligibility	  criteria	  was	  successful—it	  was	  a	  statutory	  
requirement	  that	  no	  one	  on	  the	  front	  line	  wanted	  to	  contravene.	  However,	  while	  
being	  flexible	  with	  policies	  and	  procedures	  had	  advantages	  in	  particular	  
circumstances	  there	  was	  also	  concern	  that	  this	  undermined	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  front-­‐
line	  managers	  and	  practitioners	  to	  challenge	  senior	  managers’	  entrepreneurialism.	  
	  
In	  the	  older	  persons	  team,	  for	  instance,	  interviewees	  told	  me	  about	  a	  policy	  they	  
had	  to	  work	  with	  which,	  in	  effect,	  created	  a	  waiting	  list	  from	  service	  provision	  (and	  
reducing	  spending	  on	  older	  persons	  services).	  Service	  users	  who	  met	  the	  eligibility	  
criteria	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  service	  straight	  away	  but	  had	  to	  wait	  until	  senior	  
managers	  said	  they	  could	  have	  the	  resources.	  These	  resources	  were	  not	  released	  
until	  twice	  the	  equivalent	  resource	  had	  been	  saved—only	  after	  two	  residential	  beds	  
have	  been	  vacated	  could	  one	  bed	  be	  freed	  up	  for	  admission:	  the	  ‘two	  out,	  one	  in’	  
policy.	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Local	  managers	  and	  practitioners	  were	  highly	  critical	  of	  this	  policy;	  they	  felt	  it	  might	  
be	  liable	  to	  legal	  challenge	  but	  they	  didn’t	  feel	  able	  to	  challenge	  because	  they	  were	  
fearful	  of	  criticism	  and	  blame	  failing	  on	  them	  because	  their	  practice	  had	  been	  
compromised	  by	  the	  short	  cuts	  they	  may	  have	  employed	  in	  their	  work	  to	  get	  the	  
work	  done,	  or	  to	  make	  procedures	  more	  responsive	  to	  their	  own	  values	  and	  to	  the	  
needs	  of	  services	  users:	  
We’ve	  had	  this	  ...	  confirmed	  again	  by	  the	  solicitors	  this	  week	  ...	  if	  somebody	  
ultimately	  does	  go	  to	  a	  judicial	  review	  about	  it	  [the	  authority]	  will	  almost	  
certainly	  lose	  the	  case…but	  we	  want	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  it’s	  a	  case	  where	  we	  
haven’t	  compounded	  errors	  with	  other	  things	  ...	  you	  want	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  
policy	  issue	  isn’t	  going	  to	  get	  lost	  in	  a	  whole	  load	  of	  stuff	  about	  someone	  
didn’t	  do	  this,	  or	  they	  didn’t	  fill	  in	  that	  form	  properly.	  
	  
	  
This	  concern	  about	  blame	  permeates	  public	  service	  organisations.	  Hood	  et	  al.	  
(2000)	  argue	  that	  organisational	  leaders	  are	  not	  only	  concerned	  with	  running	  the	  
organisation,	  but	  also	  with	  managing	  their	  exposure	  to	  blame	  when	  things	  go	  
wrong.	  They	  identify	  a	  range	  of	  strategies	  used	  by	  organisational	  elites	  to	  manage	  
these	  risks.	  Two	  are	  particularly	  interesting	  here.	  One	  is	  proceduralisation,	  which	  
involves	  the	  increasingly	  detailed	  specification	  of	  procedures	  and	  guidelines,	  setting	  
out	  the	  right	  way	  to	  do	  things,	  so	  that	  when	  something	  goes	  wrong	  the	  organisation	  
can	  point	  to	  the	  procedures	  as	  a	  defence	  against	  criticism.	  The	  other	  is	  ‘service	  
abandonment’.	  The	  risk	  of	  proceduralisation,	  for	  the	  organisation,	  is	  that	  it	  implies	  
an	  acceptance	  of	  responsibility.	  In	  many	  situations	  this	  is	  unavoidable,	  but	  in	  others	  
the	  organisation	  can	  reduce	  its	  exposure	  to	  blame	  by	  abandoning	  its	  responsibility	  
for	  a	  service	  area.	  At	  its	  most	  extreme,	  service	  abandonment	  involves	  withdrawing	  
from	  providing	  a	  service,	  but	  more	  often	  it	  can	  mean	  not	  ‘…issuing	  advice	  or	  
information	  for	  fear	  of	  blame,	  legal	  liability	  or	  other	  adverse	  risks’	  (ibid.:	  166).	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What	  emerges	  from	  these	  examples,	  and	  the	  case	  study	  more	  generally,	  are	  
illustrations	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  proceduralism	  and	  professional	  discretion	  can	  be	  
employed	  to	  manage	  organisational	  risk;	  and	  how	  senior	  managers	  can	  deploy	  
entrepreneurialism	  to	  both	  try	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  more	  for	  less	  and	  to	  deflect	  
potential	  blame.	  In	  concrete	  terms,	  the	  entrepreneurial	  emphasis	  was	  on	  
encouraging	  local	  discretion	  to	  cut	  corners	  and	  get	  things	  done	  with	  least	  fuss;	  but	  
this	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  cover	  for	  senior	  management—they	  cannot	  be	  
held	  to	  account	  for	  policy	  deviation,	  they	  have	  set	  out	  their	  commitments	  in	  
published	  policy,	  deviations	  must	  be	  down	  to	  individual	  bad	  practice	  at	  the	  front	  
line.	  Here,	  we	  can	  perhaps	  see	  blame-­‐shift	  as	  a	  significant	  dimension	  in	  the	  ecology	  
of	  discretion.	  This	  is	  a	  strategy	  described	  by	  Wells	  (1997)	  where	  front	  line	  staff	  are	  
put	  in	  the	  position	  of	  managing	  individual	  demands	  for	  resources	  from	  service	  users,	  
thus	  ‘distancing	  management	  and	  policy	  makers	  from	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  “felt”	  
experience	  of	  policy,	  which	  is	  ultimately	  left	  to	  practitioners	  to	  interpret’	  (ibid:340).	  
In	  this	  case	  study	  the	  process	  of	  blame-­‐shifting	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strategy	  in	  which	  
practitioners	  are	  faced	  with	  vague	  and	  imprecise	  criteria	  and	  regulations,	  which	  





In	  this	  paper	  my	  particular	  concern	  has	  been	  the	  discretion	  of	  senior	  managers	  and	  
its	  impact	  on	  policy	  implementation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  front-­‐line	  staff,	  and	  
through	  this,	  to	  consider	  Lipsky’s	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  managers	  in	  Street-­‐level	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Bureaucracy.	  Lipsky	  ‘brackets	  off’	  the	  discretion	  of	  senior	  managers	  in	  his	  discussion	  
of	  the	  ‘implementation	  gap’	  in	  public	  welfare	  organisations.	  I	  argue	  that	  
understanding	  the	  discretion	  of	  managers	  is	  as	  important	  as	  understanding	  front-­‐
line	  discretion	  and	  that	  this	  is	  so	  not	  just	  because	  senior	  managers	  are	  significant	  
policy	  actors	  but	  also	  because	  their	  choices	  and	  decisions	  contribute	  in	  a	  significant	  
way	  to	  the	  context	  within	  which	  front-­‐line	  discretion	  is	  exercised.	  
	  
Lipsky	  analysis	  of	  discretion	  in	  Street-­‐level	  Bureaucracy	  is	  interesting.	  Front	  line	  
staff	  have	  'discretion'	  but	  ‘discretion’	  is	  not	  a	  term	  he	  associates	  with	  senior	  
managers.	  However	  if	  we	  think	  about	  discretion	  as:	  ‘the	  freedom	  to	  make	  decisions	  
in	  a	  work	  role.’	  (Smith	  1981:47)	  the	  case	  study	  illustrates	  the	  fact	  that	  discretion	  
permeates	  organisations,	  including	  at	  senior	  management	  level.	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  
located	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  implementation	  but	  at	  points	  all	  along	  it.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  in	  recognising	  managers'	  discretion	  our	  attention	  is	  drawn	  to	  another	  
point:	  	  how	  then	  do	  they	  use	  their	  discretion?	  	  Here,	  we	  can	  perhaps	  understand	  why	  
Lipsky	  doesn’t	  consider	  senior	  managers'	  discretion;	  they	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  
because	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  their	  use	  of	  discretion	  shows	  a	  fundamental	  commitment	  
to	  policy.	  For	  Lipsky	  senior	  managers	  are	  simply	  concerned	  with	  reducing	  the	  gap	  
between	  performance	  on	  the	  front	  line	  and	  ‘desired	  policy	  results’	  (Lipsky	  2010	  
p.223).	  	  	  	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  front	  line	  staff,	  who,	  he	  acknowledges,	  may	  find	  their	  
work	  fulfilling	  and	  rewarding,	  but	  who	  abandon	  their	  ideals	  in	  practice	  and	  are	  
primarily	  motivated	  by	  venal	  concerns	  and	  self-­‐interest,	  developing	  work	  routines	  to	  
make	  their	  lives	  easier	  and	  acting	  in	  manipulative	  and	  controlling	  ways	  towards	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clients	  (Lipsky	  2010:	  86	  &	  202).	  	  	  However,	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  
sweeping	  assumptions	  about	  two	  different	  occupational	  groups	  —	  managers	  and	  
front	  line	  staff	  —	  are	  fair.	  Certainly	  in	  the	  case	  study	  reported	  here	  there	  were	  
examples	  of	  managers	  circumventing	  formal	  policy	  and	  issuing	  verbal	  instructions	  
quite	  contrary	  to	  formal	  policy.	  	  There	  are	  two	  important	  points	  here.	  	  First,	  that	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  some	  senior	  mangers	  reflects	  self	  interested	  and	  venal	  concerns	  it	  is	  
not	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  always	  the	  case.	  To	  do	  so	  would	  be	  as	  misguided	  as	  seeing	  the	  
motives	  of	  front	  line	  staff	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  It’s	  likely	  that	  staff	  exercising	  discretion	  
at	  whatever	  level	  of	  the	  organisation	  will	  be	  guided	  by	  a	  range	  of	  motives	  that	  we	  
should	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  assume	  and	  to	  caricature	  but	  to	  understand	  and	  explore	  
(Evans	  2014	  &	  2015).	  
	  
Second,	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  then	  that	  we	  can’t	  assume	  that	  management	  
concerns	  are	  synonymous	  with	  ‘desired	  policy	  goals’	  –	  unless	  we	  elide	  managers'	  
desires	  with	  those	  of	  policy	  makers.	  	  However,	  evidence	  from	  business,	  identifying	  
building	  tension	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  senior	  executives	  and	  shareholders	  (Colvin	  
2001),	  and	  from	  public	  service,	  where	  senior	  civil	  servants	  challenge	  the	  idea	  that	  
their	  role	  is	  simply	  to	  follow	  the	  policy	  instructions	  of	  their	  political	  masters	  
(Stratton	  2014),	  points	  to	  the	  need	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  senior	  staff	  are	  
not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  their	  institutional	  masters.	  	  	  
	  
In	  analysing	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  implementation	  we	  should	  not	  simply	  look	  at	  the	  
discretion	  of	  front	  line	  staff	  to	  understand	  the	  resulting	  policy:	  the	  discretion	  of	  
senior	  managers	  is	  also	  important.	  	  In	  seeing	  managers	  as	  discretionary	  actors	  in	  the	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policy	  implementation	  process	  –potentially	  as	  active,	  at	  least,	  as	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucrats—raises	  another	  point:	  how	  do	  the	  discretionary	  decisions	  and	  actions	  
affect	  the	  context	  and	  environment	  within	  which	  their	  subordinates	  have	  to	  act:	  
what	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  discretion	  on	  people	  down	  the	  policy	  line?	  	  
	  
Lipsky	  talks	  about	  conditions	  of	  work	  of	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  as	  ‘the	  corrupted	  
worlds	  of	  service’	  (ibid.	  xv).	  He	  talks	  of:	  ‘The	  ambiguity	  and	  unclarity	  of	  goals	  and	  
the	  unavailability	  of	  appropriate	  performance	  measures	  in	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracies’	  (2010:	  40).	  In	  the	  case	  study	  the	  corrupted	  world	  of	  service	  wasn’t	  
simply	  ‘out	  there’;	  it	  was,	  in	  part,	  created	  by	  the	  decisions	  and	  choices	  made	  by	  
senior	  managers	  within	  the	  organisation.	  And	  it	  was	  more	  than	  simply	  the	  context	  
of	  choices	  Lipsky	  talks	  about.	  	  In	  the	  case	  study	  the	  running	  together	  of	  formal	  and	  
informal	  policy	  created	  dilemmas	  and	  challenges	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  formal	  policies	  
were	  must-­‐dos	  and	  which	  were	  more	  open	  to	  negotiation.	  	  And	  this	  linked	  to	  senior	  
managers'	  expectations	  of	  front	  line-­‐practitioners,	  in	  that	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  
entrepreneurial	  in	  their	  use	  of	  discretion	  to	  negotiate	  this	  tension.	  Staff	  in	  the	  case	  
study	  understood	  organisationally	  that	  to	  make	  services	  work	  they	  had	  to	  cut	  
corners,	  and	  that	  senior	  managers	  would	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  them	  bending	  or	  
ignoring	  rules	  to	  do	  this.	  However,	  this	  entrepreneurship	  was	  not	  only	  about	  taking	  
short	  cuts	  to	  get	  the	  work	  done	  in	  difficult	  circumstances,	  it	  was	  also	  about	  taking	  
risks	  and	  hazarding	  moral	  luck	  (Williams	  1981)	  —	  if	  things	  go	  wrong,	  however	  well	  
intentioned	  or	  beyond	  your	  control,	  you	  potentially	  expose	  yourself	  to	  blame.	  	  
	  
The	  case	  study	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  context	  within	  which	  front	  line	  staff	  have	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to	  make	  choices	  and	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  use	  discretion.	  	  In	  the	  case	  study	  
front-­‐	  line	  staff	  faced	  not	  only	  the	  often	  uncomfortable	  choices	  about	  whether	  or	  
not	  to	  follow	  policy,	  but	  also	  whether	  the	  (informal)	  policy	  they	  were	  being	  asked	  to	  
implement	  was	  itself	  in	  line	  with	  (formal)	  policy	  and	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  any	  
mismatch	  between	  the	  two.	  And	  the	  choice	  was	  not	  only	  how	  to	  use	  discretion	  but	  
also	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  refuse	  to	  use	  it	  –	  as	  was	  the	  case	  where	  the	  practitioners	  
refused	  to	  implement	  informal	  eligibility	  criteria	  when	  asked	  to	  by	  senior	  managers.	  
In	  a	  sense	  here	  these	  practitioners	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  exercising	  their	  discretion	  as	  
judgement:	  refusing	  to	  carry	  out	  organisational	  instructions	  that	  they	  understood	  to	  
be	  contrary	  to	  the	  legal	  requirement	  to	  apply	  published	  eligibility	  criteria.	  	  For	  
Lipksy	  this	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  example,	  once	  again	  of	  their	  venality	  –	  they	  were	  
refusing	  to	  make	  the	  best	  of	  the	  discretion	  they	  had	  available	  to	  them	  to	  make	  the	  
policy	  work.	  However,	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Kadish	  and	  
Kadish’s	  (2010)	  idea	  of	  the	  discretion	  to	  disobey.	  Rather	  than	  expect	  compliance	  
from	  public	  officials,	  their	  disobedience	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  misguided	  
orders	  or	  challenges	  when	  instructions	  run	  against	  the	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  policy.	  	  
Discretion	  here	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  correcting	  the	  distortion	  of	  policy	  by	  senior	  
management.	  	  Interestingly,	  this	  point	  has	  becoming	  increasingly	  pertinent	  in	  the	  
wake	  of	  the	  Francis	  Report	  on	  deaths	  in	  an	  NHS	  hospital	  in	  the	  English	  midlands	  
(‘mid	  Staffs’),	  where	  concern	  was	  expressed	  about	  compliance	  of	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
with	  instructions	  from	  senior	  management,	  which	  were	  felt	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  good	  
patient	  care	  (Francis	  2013).	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Senior	  Managers,	  as	  well	  as	  front	  line	  workers,	  are	  significant	  actors	  with	  discretion	  
in	  their	  own	  right	  within	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies.	  Senior	  managers	  can’t	  simply	  be	  
understood	  as	  perfect	  policy	  servants	  in	  their	  role	  as	  policy	  implementers;	  their	  
motives	  and	  concerns	  need	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  and	  role	  
of	  their	  discretion	  on	  policy	  and	  its	  implementation.	  A	  case	  study	  can	  extend	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of,	  and	  develop	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
approach	  to,	  theory	  	  (Burawoy	  1991,Walton	  1992),	  and	  these	  insights	  can	  then	  be	  
extended	  to	  other	  cases	  that	  fit	  the	  basic	  conditions	  assumed	  in	  the	  analysis	  (Goom	  
et	  al.	  2000).	  In	  this	  study	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  extend	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
structuring	  of	  discretion	  in	  street-­‐level	  bureaucracies	  —	  the	  basic	  characteristics	  
of	  which	  are	  policy	  uncertainty	  and	  resource	  and	  policy	  mismatch.	  The	  
findings	  of	  this	  study	  	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  discretion	  within	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucracies	  in	  a	  more	  rounded	  way	  and	  with	  a	  more	  critical	  eye.	  Recognising	  that	  
discretion	  exists	  at	  street	  level	  should	  not	  exclude	  consideration	  of	  discretion	  by	  
managers,	  or	  the	  context	  within	  which	  street-­‐level	  discretion	  is	  exercised,	  which	  is	  
structured	  by	  a	  range	  of	  factors,	  including	  managerial	  decisions.	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